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Brodsky and Cohen: "Uncle Sam", the Product Safety Man: Consumer Product Safety Stan

"UNCLE SAM", THE.PRODUCT SAFETY MAN:
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARDS IN
THE MARKETPLACE AND IN THE COURTS
James A. Brodsky* & Marsha N. Cohen**
In February of 1904, a raging fire erupted in downtown Baltimore, Maryland. Although the turn of the century was still
largely an age of kerosene lamps and wooden buildings, the business community had prided itself on the "fireproof' brick and
stone construction of its office buildings. One by one, however,
these completely "fireproof" structures, surrounded as they were
with wooden stables and filled with highly combustible partitions
and furnishings, succumbed to the intensity of the flames. Within
three hours, engine companies arrived by train from Washington,
and all that day and the next, additional fire units from nearby
counties, from New York, Philadelphia, Annapolis, Wilmington,
Chester, York, Altoona, and Harrisburg, rushed to the scene. Unfortunately, these firefighters were able to do little more than
stand by helplessly until the fire eventually burned itself out,
thirty hours later.
The reason? Although there was plenty of water, the hoses
of the visiting fire companies matched neither those of the other
visitors nor the nozzles of the Baltimore hydrants.
The cost? Incalculable human suffering, the destruction of
1,526 buildings and all electric light, telephone, telegraph, and
power facilities in an area of more than seventy city blocks.'
The moral? A standard, describing uniform screw thread
construction, was urgently needed.
Sixty years earlier, in an 1864 paper read before the Franklin
Institute, William Sellers had urged the creation of a uniform
American screw thread standard, arguing that "in this country no
organized attempt has as yet been made to establish any system
[of screw threads], each manufacturer having adopted whatever
his judgment may have dictated as the best, or as the most
convenient, for himself, but

. .

so radical a defect should be

* B.S., Cornell University; M.S. (Electrical Engineering), Columbia University;
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
** B.A., Smith College; J.D., Harvard Law School.
Both authors are attorneys on the staff of the Washington, D.C., law office of Consumers Union of United States, Inc. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors.
1. R. COCHRANE, MEASURES FOR PROGRESS 84-86 (1966). See generally Hemenway, The
Role of Industry-wide Standards, April, 1970 (unpublished paper).
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allowed to exist no longer." '2
Sixty years after the Baltimore fire, in 1964, the surrounding
counties still were being confronted with and confounded by vary3
ing fire hydrant screw threads.
Ironically, prehistoric man had proven more prescient in his
recognition of the necessity for standardization in certain fields
than his modern descendants in Baltimore, Maryland. Ancient
civilizations, for instance, had long recognized the necessity for a
uniform system of weights and measures. In fact, specimens of
standardized weights in ratios of 1:2:4:8, and decimally divided
length scales, dating back to 3500 B.C., have been unearthed at
several sites in the Indus Valley on the Indian subcontinent., And
it is known that the Mohenjo-daro civilization of that area developed a linear scale bearing a striking resemblance to the contemporary measuring devices of Babylon, thousands of miles away.'
Even the Bible cautions in Proverbs11:1that: "A false balance is
abomination to the Lord, but a just weight is His delight."
With the development at the end of the eighteenth century
of the metric system by the French Academy of Science, the
system of measurement prevalent during the Middle Ages and
based on the dimensions of the human body gave way, and the
present day standards movement was launched. Spurred by the
advent of mass production and the interchangeability of parts, as
well as the needs of allied nations during the international wars,
the standards movement has spawned a bureaucracy and motive
7
force of its own on both the international and national levels.
Though the standards movement in general-and the voluntary standardization system in particular-is ripe for intensive
public scrutiny,8 the scope of this article is not so comprehensive.
2. "Sellers, William," DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
3. See COCHRANE, supra note 1, at 85.

BIOGRAPHY, Vol. XVI

(1935).

4. L. VERMAN, STANDARDIZATION 4 (1973).

5. Id.
6. Id. at 8.
7. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), for example, serves as the
nation's coordinating body and clearinghouse for some 200 organizations which develop
standards in the United States. ANSI also represents this country in the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and other international standards groups. See
note 20, infra, and accompanying text.
8. Compare Opala, The Anatomy of Private Standards-MakingProcess:The Operating Proceduresof the USA Standards Institute, 22 OKLA. L. REv. 45 (1969) ("Neither the
nature of nongovernmental standards-making process nor its impact on the law has received much attention, if any, in the legal literature in recent years") with Safety in the
Marketplace, Sub-Council on Product Safety of the National Business Council for Con-
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We narrow our focus to that portion of the standards movement
which is concerned with consumer product safety in the United
States. Of necessity, our examination requires a definitional
framework and a brief inquiry into standardization as a discipline. It also requires a familiarity with the economic forces that
shape the voluntary and mandatory standards. But once having
brushed these areas lightly, we will turn to the core of our inquiry:
the role of consumer product safety standards in the marketplace
and in the courts.
I.

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARDS IN THE MARKETPLACE

A.

DefinitionalFramework

Perhaps the best definition of the term "standard" was offered by one who early recognized the importance of standardization, Jessie Coles. He defined a standard as9
a model for a material object or a rule for a course of action
established by authority, custom or general consent by which
others of a like nature may be identified, compared, or regulated, or which in itself represents the ideal or the "one best"
for a particular purpose.
sumer Affairs (G.P.O. Stock No. 5274-00009) (1973) ("A program for the improvement of
consumer product safety").
As Francis LaQue, long a force in the standardization discipline, wrote in his
Foreword to the VERMAN text, supra note 4:
For far too long [educators and educational institutions] have failed to appreciate the importance of standardization in so many disciplinary fields. Students
should leave universities with at least an awareness of the impact that standardization will make on the use they will be making of what they have been taught
in their specific areas of interest and in their future activities. This will obviously be the case in the practice of the several branches of engineering. However, it must extend as well to such fields as sociology, political science, economics, law, banking and commerce.
It is to be hoped that universities will recognize the importance of cultivating an awareness of the potential impact of standardization in so many areas of
activity.
9. J. COLES, STANDARDIZATION OF CONsuMtERs' GOODS 78 (1932). Coles had not been
alone in attempting to field a workable definition. The "classic" attempt, offering a "most
picturesque panorama of what is covered by the term standard," VERMAN, supra note 4
at 22, is that of John Gaillard. His comprehensive and original treatise, INusTRIA STANDARDIZATION-ITS PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION (1934), offered the following at p. 123:
A standard is a formulation established verbally, in writing or by any other
graphical method, or by means of a model, sample or other physical means of
representation, to serve during a certain period of time for defining, designating
or specifying certain features of a unit or basis of measurement, a physical
object, an action, a process, a method, a practice, a capacity, a function, a duty,
a right, a responsibility, a behaviour, an attitude, a concept or a conception.
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Standards are developed, naturally enough, through the
process of "standardization": °
Standardization is the process of formulating and applying rules
for an orderly approach to a specific activity for the benefit and
with the cooperation of all concerned, and in particular for the
promotion of optimum overall economy taking due account of
functional conditions and safety requirements.
It is based on the consolidated results of science, technique
and experience. It determines not only the basis for the present
but also for future development, and it should keep pace with
progress.
Some particular applications are:
(1) Units of measurement.
(2) Terminology and symbolic representation.
(3) Products and processes (definition and selection of characteristics of products; testing and measuring methods; specifications of characteristics of production, for defining their quality,
regulation of variety, interchangeability, etc.).
(4) Safety of persons and goods.
Standards cover almost all phases of mankind's socioeconomic activity: engineering, transportation, housing, food,
agriculture, forestry, textiles, chemicals, commerce, science, edu-

cation, sport, and music, for instance. And for each of these different "subjects" of standardization, a variety of "aspects" may
be addressed. For example, if the "subject" of a particular stanAnd, in terms of authoritative impact, the International Organization for Standardization's definition, though it is brief, should not be ignored:

A standard is the result of a particular standardization effort, approved by a
recognized authority. It may take the form of:
(1) a document containing a set of conditions to be fulfilled (in

French "norme")
(2)

a fundamental unit or physical constant-examples: ampere,

absolute zero (Kelvin) (in French "talon")
(3) an object for physical comparison-examples: metre (in French
"talon").
Definitions 1-Standardization vocabulary: basic terms and definitions, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, 5 (1971).
Critics of this ISO formulation have proposed still further revisions. See Sen, Defining
Standardization,23 ISI BULLETN 389-90 (1971).
10. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Definitions, supra note 9.
Somehow, whenever international or national standardization organizations define basic
terms, safety considerations always seem to bring up the rear. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 47 (1970) (hereinafter cited as NCPS FINAL
REPORT). Perhaps the enactment of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2051
et seq., will alter that pattern, at least in the United States. See note 42.1, infra, and
accompanying text.
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dard is the ubiquitous "widget", the following "aspects" of the
"widget" are among those which particular standards might address: specifications of safety, quality, composition, or performance; nomenclature for the "widget" and its parts; test methods
to evaluate particularized characteristics; component designs to
promote interchangeability; and packaging or labeling protocols.
Finally, depending on which group of interests creates and uses
the standards, each "subject", such as the "widget", for each of
its "aspects", may be regulated by standards at any one of a
number of "levels." Thus, the standard which specifies the "safe
performance" aspect of the "widget" might be: an individual
standard established by a large governmental agency, such as the
General Services Administration, to guide purchasing; a
company-wide standard designed to guide manufacturing operations; an industry-wide or trade association standard; or a national or international standard."
Standards also fall into different categories. They may, for
example, be either mandatory or voluntary in character. Mandatory standards are established by government and are enforced by
law. The federal Consumer Product Safety Commission,12 for example, has issued a mandatory standard under the FederalHazardous SubstancesAct 3 for full-size baby cribs.' 3.' Cribs which do
not meet the standard's requirements as to dimensions, spacing
between crib slats, hardware, construction, finishing, warnings,
and labels are banned. Violation of such mandatory standards
may constitute a public offense, even when no one is injured. In
contrast, voluntary standards are not promulgated by govern11. Verman, in his text on STANDARDIZATION, supra note 4 at 32-39, has organized
these three phases of the standardization discipline into what he has denominated the
"standardization space." Diagrammatically, this space is three-dimensional, with "subject," "aspect" and "level" constituting the X-, Y- and Z- axes of reference. In such a
space, the widget would occupy a point on the "subject" or X-axis, with, say, the safety
"aspect" of its design occupying a point on the Y-axis, and the national "level" standard
describing its Z-axis location. The virtue of this, or any other, organization of the complex
world of standardization, is that it permits this discipline to be studied and discussed in
a systematic fashion to "bring about a deeper understanding of the underlying theories
and the guiding principles so essential for the advancement and practical application of
any given body of knowledge." Id. at xiv.
12. The Commission and the Act which created it are described in greater detail at
notes 42.1-56, infra, and accompanying text.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§1261 et seq.
13.1. This standard became effective on February 1, 1974. See 16 C.F.R. 1508.
14. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, at 48. Section 19(a)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(1), makes the distribution in commerce of any consumer product
which is not in conformity with an applicable consumer product safety standard a "prohibited act" subject to civil and criminal penalties.
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ment and their use and acceptance by those segments of the
private sector which do formulate them is not required by either
state or federal statute or regulation. 5
Standards may also be classified as either "performance" or
"descriptive." "Descriptive or 'specification' or 'design' standards define materials or forms, whereas performance standards
tell what a product should do, no matter how it is made."' 5 By
describing the physical form of the product, or the warnings, or
instruction labels that must accompany it, as opposed to the
levels of performance the product must meet, the descriptive
standard necessarily limits design initiatives. For that reason,
performance standards, where practicable, are favored."
To promote voluntary compliance with safety standards,
manufacturers frequently adopt a certification program. Certification is the mechanism by which products are identified as conforming to a given standard or set of standards. It generally consists of seals, stamps, or endorsements which indicate conformity
to the certifier's requirements. If the manufacturer certifies his
own products, he acts as a self-certifier. Unforturnately, as the
National Commission on Product Safety (N.C.P.S.) found,
"[s]elf-certification too often is merely self-serving."' 8 Thirdparty certification, on the other hand, is normally done by an
15. As discussed infra at note 22 and accompanying text, however, the use of the term
"voluntary" to describe these industry-promulgated standards is misleading, since economic and other considerations exert an element of compulsion to comply with such
standards. Cf. NCPS Final Report, at 48. A recent Federal Trade Commission study
concluded that while most private standards activity is termed "voluntary," its economic
effect is often no different than if the standards had the force of law. "In either case, the
ability of a manufacturer to sell a product which does not meet the prevailing standard is
severely restricted and in some cases may not exist at all. This is due to heavy reliance
upon the standards by government procurement agencies, industrial buyers, local legislative bodies and increasingly by consumers, none of whom may possess the information or
the expertise necessary to evaluate the standard itself or the true meaning of any certification based upon it." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PreliminaryStaff Study (Precis):SelfRegulation-ProductStandardization,Certification and Seals of Approval, at 18.
16. NCPS FINAL REPORT at 47-48.
17. Id. at 48. Under Section 7(a) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2056(a), the Commission is authorized to promulgate consumer product safety standards consisting "of one or more of any of the following types of requirements: (1) Requirements as to performance, composition, contents, design, construction, finish, or packaging
of a consumer product. (2) Requirements that a consumer product be marked with or
accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or instructions, or requirements respecting
the form of warnings or instructions." The Act goes on to caution, however, that "[tihe
requirements of such a standard (other than requirements relating to labeling, warnings,
or instructions) shall, whenever feasible, be expressed in terms of performance requirements."
18. NCPS FINAL REPoirr at 48.
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outside organization, supposedly free of the control or influence
of the manufacturer. "At worst, certification may be employed
primarily to gain the consumer's confidence rather than to assure
compliance with high safety or quality standards."'"
B. Economics
Given the complexity, difficulty, and cost of the effort,2" why
do the various producer groups write and pay for the development
of voluntary standards for the products they manufacture? The
answer, suggests the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, is
two-fold:2 '
First, by lessening, for example, the amount of communication
that would otherwise have to go on between the individual seller
and his buyers in order to create a meeting of the minds on the
essentials of quality, quantity, and price, the firm's-and, in the
aggregate, the industry's-costs are reduced and, ultimately
(assuming the presence of effective competition) prices to the
consuming public.[2 2 ] That motivation alone, however, would

not, in many instances, be sufficient to produce the elaborate
standardization and certification programs that exist in the in19. Id. A properly validated idealized certification program can be beneficial. A product bearing the mark of a third-party certifier can represent a guarantee to the consumer
that: (1) the product has been produced according to an accepted standard, which is
publicly available for everyone's inspection; (2) its production has been carried out under
continued supervision; (3) the product has been tested and inspected for conformity with
the standard; and (4) the owner of the certification mark stands ready to redress any
grievance flowing from the failure of the product to live up to the quality the presence of
the mark signifies. See VEnmAN, supra note 4, at 232. This latter guarantee of the certifier
has led to legally enforceable rights of action by the victims of inadequate certification.
See, e.g., Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967)
(Underwriters' Laboratories, which had arranged with the manufacturer to prescribe standards that would render the manufacturer's fire extinguisher safe for use, could be held
liable under state law to one injured as a result of its negligent approval of the extinguisher
design).
20. The central coordinating body for the entire system of voluntary standardization
in the United States is the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). See generally
Opala, supra note 8. ANSI's two million dollar annual budget has been described as
"severely limited," allowing "very little room for executing its total mission once the
operating costs related to processing standards are met." Safety in the Marketplace,supra
note 8 at 41. The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the largest standards writer in the country, has a staff of 150 with 120 national technical committees
which have written nearly 5,000 voluntary consensus standards. See ASTM and Voluntary
Consensus Standards, AMER. Soc. FOR TESTING AND MArE=ALS (1973).
21. PreliminaryStaff Study, supra note 15 at 9 (emphasis in the original).
22. Dividing up society into groups of "producers" (including processors, assemblers,
and service agencies), "traders" (including wholesalers, retailers, importers, and exporters), "consumers" (including industrial and ultimate users), and "technologists" (including scientists, engineers, testers, and certifiers), VERMAN, supra note 4 at 44-45, lists the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1974], Art. 11

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 2, 1974]

dustries. The more compelling motive for the development of
these programs is generally the fact that the buyers of the product, or at least those that are large enough to be able to do so,
have demanded the development of this kind of information,
thereby forcing the industry to produce it.

In other words, as is not surprising, producers develop standards
largely in response to the market's demand for them, and because
such standards are in the producer's economic self-interest.
In the producer-goods market, for example, commercial enterprises buy products from suppliers for incorporation into their
own "producer-goods" and eventually, for retail sale to the consumer. In this highly organized producer-goods market, expert
buyers at the producer level demand sufficient product information to facilitate the making of economical purchasing decisions.
Adequate standards which enable such buyers to compare similar
products in terms of their real economic value soon follow. In the
consumer-goods market, however, the small quantities purchased
values served by standardization for each of these units as follows: For "producers,"
standards
(1) provide short cuts to design procedures by furnishing ready-made and
generally accepted solutions to recurring problems; (2) make possible longer
production runs with fewer changes in production line and reduce tooling and
set-up time; (3) streamline inspection and testing and enable quality control
procedures to reduce rejections and re-working; (4) enable the procurement of
raw materials, interchangeable parts and components from ready stocks without
loss of time; (5) reduce stocks and inventory of materials, parts and endproducts; (6) simplify servicing and maintenance; (7) facilitate training of staff
and operators; (8) reduce overheads on clerical and administrative work; (9)
facilitate marketing and winning of consumer confidence; and (10) as a consequence of all these factors, lead to higher productivity in every department,
which means reduced costs, lower prices, higher sales and greater profitability.
According to Verman, those members of his "trade" class derive much of these same
benefits from the existence of standards, as well as "facility in market expansion" and
"greater turn-over and higher profit on investment," a "basis [upon] which procurement
of stocks and their sales can be readily arranged to meet clearly defined customer needs,"
and the reduction to a minimum of "the possibility of misunderstanding leading to unnecessary trade disputes and arbitration proceedings-a great asset, particularly in international trade." Id. at 45.
Finally, after noting similar benefits for both "consumers" and "technologists," Verman turns to the "ultimate or everyday consumer-the common man." He, states Verman, "has been somewhat limited in his ability to profit fully from the benefits conferred
Suffice it to say here that though he may be somewhat limited in
by standards ....
deriving the full scope of the benefits as compared to his counterpart, the industrial
consumer, he nevertheless shares with the latter the possibility of deriving the same or
similar benefits." Id. at 46.
For a similar example of Verman's hopelessly unrealistic view of the benefits to be
derived by the ultimate consumer from the existing standardization process, see the text
at note 36 infra.
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by the individual consumer preordain to failure his efforts to
obtain comparable product information through standards. As
Tibor Scitovsky has succinctly noted:23
I should regard the buyer's information as cause and the market's organization as effect; and I believe that the market's
perfection depends on the buyer's expertness. For it is only the
expert buyer who insists on comparing rival products before
every purchase; and it is only his insistence on making comparisons that forces the seller- or rather makes it profitable for
him-to make his product easily comparable to competing products. Hence the geographical concentration of the expert's market and the grading and standardizationof products in such a
market should not be considered data. . . .They are a result
of a deliberate effort on the part of producers; and I believe that
such an effort will only be made in the expert's market, in response to the expert buyer's demand for easy comparability.
Without the information the individual consumer needs
(which could be supplied by objective standards in the consumergoods market just as it is furnished to the producer-goods market), he is unable to play his essential function in the freeenterprise system.2 4 This has especially serious consequences for
product safety. "The theoretical function of the market is to arrive at mutually satisfactory cost-benefit ratios for buyers and
sellers. As applied to product safety, the market in theory asks,
given limited resources, what goods and performance should be
traded off at what cost for the removal of specific hazards?"25 The
problem, however, is that "[c]onsumers generally have no way
of knowing how much more they would have to pay to obtain a
comparable product as serviceable and less hazardous. Even
when aware of a risk in a product, consumers cannot predict the
frequency, severity, or probability of injury."2
Though hamstrung by limited information, the consumer in
the marketplace still must engage in trade-offs. Most products
cannot be 100% safe and, even if it were technologically feasible
to make them so, the cost could be prohibitive. 7 The consumer
23. Scitovsky, Ignorance as a Source of Oligopoly Power, XL AMERICAN ECONOMIC
REV. 49 (1950). See generally PreliminaryStaff Study, supra note 15 at 9-14.
24. See R. LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 49-68 (rev. ed.

1960).
25. NCPS FINAL REPORT at 69.
26. Id. See also Rosenthal, Illusory Promises, 8 TRIAL No. 1 at 18 (1972).
27. Some products, however, may undergo quantum leaps in safety characteristics

with only negligible cost increases. "The cost to the consumer of reducing injuries from
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then must, within the limits of his own knowledge, balance the
cost to him of safety, performance, aesthetic quality, and maintenance, against the costs of other budget items before making the
purchasing decision.
The manufacturer also makes trade-offs. He balances be2
tween 8
the costs of achieving performance, safety, the quality that can
be sold at a range of prices, consumer demand for safety,
spending money on safety vs. the sales organization or service
organization, or building durability into products, holding down
maintenance expenditure, advertising and other forms of promotion, relative prices, etc. In short, the producers must analyze
the elasticity of response of the consumer in relation to the
variables to which the producer applies outlays.
But these trade-offs, made by both manufacturer and illinformed consumer in the competitive marketplace, hardly begin
to balance the vast social costs associated with dangerous consumer products against their benefits. 29 And that is where, in the
words of the N.C.P.S., "the transaction between manufacturer
and consumer will need assistance from a third party."3'

C. The Government as Third Party
The role of this third party, so necessary in the view of the
N.C.P.S. to protect consumers from unreasonably hazardous
products, 31
is to define, with the public interest in mind, the terms or even
the specific standards of safety which govern the transaction
between the manufacturer and consumer, to their mutual satisfaction. The third party may substitute the judgment of a safety
explosions of soda bottles through 100 percent pressure testing works out to less than 2/10
cents per bottle.
...The cost to the consumer of reducing injuries from explosion of aerosol cans,
through the use of a safety vent, was said to be between 3.5 and 5.5 cents per can.
... It would cost next to nothing to color furniture polish so that children would not
mistake it for milk or sirup." NCPS FINAL REPORT at 68.

28. Weston, Economic Aspects of Consumer Product Safety, NCPS HEARINGS, Vol.
9A, at IX-161. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, at 69.
29. The social costs of product injury, as summarized by the National Commission
on Product Safety, include, in addition to the generally nonquantiflable loss of consortium, massive expenditures for health care facilities for, and delivery to, those injured
through safety defects, loss of income and tax revenues, and lost production. See NCPS
FINAL REPORT at 68.
30. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 70. Compare Henderson, Book Review, 51 BOSTON U.L. REV. 704 (1971).
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committee with no funds at stake for the judgment of a manufacturer who risks his capital to offer the consumer a choice of
products.
The third party may also substitute the committee's judgment for the consumer's supposedly free choice ...
Given authority, the third party may say that, in the interest of protecting others the manufacturer must accept a smaller
profit or risk a large loss unless the consumer is willing to pay
what it costs to reduce an unreasonable hazard to an acceptable
degree.
Third party intervention also may, in some cases, tell the
consumer how much of a risk he should accept, even when he is
willing to accept a greater risk without regard for the
consequences to others.
There is nothing unfamiliar about such third-party intervention in the economy. Third parties regulate a wide range of
services and products, and they frequently supersede decisions
by those who take the immediate and primary risk-producers
and consumers. A producer, of course, risks only capital, while
the consumer risks his money and his safety, perhaps even his
life.
Writing in June, 1970, the N.C.P.S. concluded that: "[a]lthough
there remains ample room for private enterprise to reduce undue
risks, even in a competitive market, only a Government presence
can require prompt compliance with responsible manufacturing
practices in the interest of safety." 32
It is now almost four years later, and although that third
party governmental entity is alive in the form of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, 33 the desirability of and necessity for
such a public, instead of private, third party intervenor in the
standards-writing business is still being questioned.3 4 For example, some skeptics continue to believe that the preexisting voluntary standards system is entirely adequate. Consider the following paean to the voluntary standards-writing process offered
32. NCPS FINAL REPORT, at 71-72. But see Friedman, A LibertarianSpeaks, 8 TRIAL
No. 1 at 22 (1972). Economist Milton Friedman argues, and not without some cogency,
that "The consumer is best served when government intervention into business is minimal .... The basic uncontrovertible fact is that improvements in services come from
free, competitive enterprise. It is government which provides the shoddy products."
33. See notes 42.1-62, infra, and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Moore, Product Safety-Who Should Absorb the Cost?, 8 TRIAL No. 1
at 26 (1972) (arguing for enterprise liability rather than product safety standards to reduce
product injuries); O'Connell, Expanding No-fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some
Proposals,59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973); Friedman, supra note 32.
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only a year ago by the Managing Director of the world's largest
standards writing body:3"
Once upon a time in the far-away kingdom of Platonia, a child
was flying a kite, when a thunderstorm came up suddenly.
Lightning struck the kite, ran down the string, and killed the
child.
The citizens were horrified. The king responded with an
edict: "Kite strings shall not conduct electricity." The citizens
sat back in relief. But the men who made kite strings were in a
turmoil. They knew that everything conducts electricity, more
or less, and when it is wet, more rather than less. They petitioned the king to be more explicit.
So the king studied the matter. Twelve months later he
issued a new royal edict telling more precisely what conductivity
would be allowed in kite strings and under what conditions.
The kite string makers went back to their plants and selected materials to meet the new edict, and soon children
throughout Platonia were happily flying kites with the new
strings.
But before long the children were complaining of sore and
bleeding hands. The surface of the new string material was too
abrasive for their tender flesh.
So the king issued a new edict, and the manufacturers responded by treating their kite string material to make it less
abrasive.
This time, when the children took to the fields and pastures
of Platonia, their kites began flying off in all directions, because
the strings were breaking.
So the king amended his edict once again, adding a minimum tensile strength requirement.
Now the kite strings held, but they were so strong and stiff that
the children were unable to wind them on their bobbins without
much snarling and kinking.
Again the king issued a pronunciamento. The manufacturers devised a chemical treatment to relax the string material
without sacrificing its strength.
For some months it appeared that the problem was solved.
But then a strange rash began to appear on many of the children's hands. The king's dermatologist told him that these children apparently were allergic to the chemicals used by the string
manufacturers.
The king demanded that the chemical treatment be
changed.
35. Cavanaugh, Standards the Hard Way, ASTM
1973.
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After much laboratory work and more than two years of
allergy tests, the manufacturers perfected a treatment for their
strings to replace the rash-producing one.
This time, however, when the children rushed out to try
their new kite string material, to their great disappointment the
kites refused to fly, except in the very strongest of gales. The
new string was too heavy.
By now, it was nearly seven years since the lightning tragedy. The price of kite string was so high that only the children
of the wealthiest families could afford to fly kites. Manufacturers were abandoning kite string for other products. The old king
had died. His young successor decided to try a new approach.
He formed a Royal Committee on Kite Strings, to which he
appointed certain of his subjects who were experts on materials
of every kind, several of the remaining string manufacturers, the
most precocious of the young kite fliers, the Court Physician, the
Royal Treasurer, and other sundry sages. "Give me," he said,
"a full consensus standard for kite strings."
Which was a Solomon-like move. To do some things, a committee is no way; to do others, it is the only way.
Or consider this excerpt from Verman's comprehensive text,
entitled Standardization:36
The most remarkable historical development in the realm
of standardization has been the evolution of the authority which
makes voluntary standards effective instruments for guiding
commerce and industry and thus constituting an economic force
in national life and also in international trade. This is brought
about mainly by following the consensus principle in preparing
standards, by which the largest possible agreement is secured
among all interests concerned with the use of standards, such
as the producer, the user, the trader and the technologist. Once
all these interests have agreed and a common ground upon
which to base the standard has been found, the standard acquires an authority possibly much more powerful than a legal
instrument might which has secured only a 51 percent majority
vote in its favour. . . . Standardization through consensus does
sometimes mean compromises to be made, but then it is always
much more practical to have voluntary standards prevail where
constant policing is neither feasible nor necessary . ...
The question has sometimes been asked: if the consensus
principle has been so successful in voluntary standardization,
why can't it be extended to other spheres of man's activity, such
36.

VERMAN,

supra note 4, at 11-12 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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as the democratic decisions to be made in his political and social
affairs? [footnote omitted]. A time may come when the commonly prevailing 51 percent majority rule may yet be replaced
by the consensusprincipleand man may as a result begin to live
more harmoniously under a new form of democracy in which
every voice would carry its own weight, however small, and decisions would be made more on the basis of weightages of the
complex needs of society as a whole rather than on what the
party holding 51 percent seats might have decided. Exactly how
this state of affairs would be brought about is not quite clear,
but it may well be the next step in the evolution of democracies
that govern the majority of humanity today.
When the rose-colored glasses of the apologists are removed,
however, the all-too-dismal prior record of the voluntary consensus groups, at least in the field of consumer product safety, is
revealed. The consensus principle in reality bears little resemblance to these Disneyland versions of its attributes. Morris Kaplan, then Technical Director of Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. (Consumers Union) offered a very different view in
testimony before the National Commission on Product Safety:"
The industry representatives dominate the meetings. The consensus principle means in practice that the industry people have
veto power over any action taken by the committee. . . . In
effect, then, the object of the exercise is to get industry agreement, often arranged before the meeting anyway, and to push
the standard through the paperwork of [the standard group's]
procedures so that it may be issued as a [national] standard.
Our proposals [as consumer representatives], our negative
votes, are given "due deliberation," which is the phrase used in
examining negative votes, but are ultimately vetoed or overridden, as without merit. After a while it seems fruitless to spend
the time and money to go to such meetings. . . . If standards
for consumer goods in general and safety standardsin particular
are to be developed and used in the consumer interest, a better
way will have to be found than this consensus principle. Volunteerism and token consumer representation have been generally
unsuccessful in protecting the consumer interest, and for the
reasons given, can be expected to be no more effective in the
future.
Indeed, the safety record of the voluntary standards-writing
consensus groups bears out this dismal portrait. In 1970, when the
37. NCPS

HEARINGS,

vol. 1, 1-296-98. See also Opala, supra note 8, at 53-54.
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National Commission on Product Safety finished its work, it estimated that there were approximately 20 million consumer
product-related injuries a year, 110,000 of which left their victims
permanently disabled, and 30,000 of which were fatal. These estimates are conservative.38 Yet, while this carnage was continuing
unabated, the NCPS noted that the 48 leading voluntary
standards-writing organizations had already promulgated more
than 1,000 industry standards applicable in some fashion to the
safety characteristics of the 350 product categories it surveyed. 9
No wonder, then, that the NCPS concluded that "[t]hese
[voluntary] standards are chronically inadequate, both in scope
and permissible levels of risk. 39 -1 It went on to state that 0
[iun no standards procedure can it be said that consumers have
a substantial voice. Rarely have they an effective veto. Safety
itself has been a secondary consideration in the usual process of
developing voluntary standards. The need for a consensus commonly waters down a proposed standard until it is little more
than an affirmation of the status quo ...
Dependence on industry financing and technical experts
who are paid by industry as regular employees, consultants, or
contractors tend to subordinate national interest to private
ends. Compliance with voluntary safety standards consists in
large part of an honor system which has proven on occasion to
be less than honorable.
Moreover, these voluntary organizations have a substantial
history of failing to comply even with their own written procedures. Thus, in 1968, in its report to the Select Committee on
Small Business of the United States House of Representatives, a
subcommittee concluded that:4'
The records of hearings .. .are replete with examples of
38. "Inthe few months since we've been in business, we've analyzed some of our data
and believe the National Commission's injury estimates are LOW (emphasis original)!
Now I don't particularly like to play the numbers game, but suffice it to say, we are dealing
with more like 25 to 30 million injuries a year." Remarks of Richard 0. Simpson, Chairman, Consumer Product Safety Commission, before the 4th Annual Product Liability
Prevention Conference, Newark College of Engineering, Newark, New Jersey, Aug. 22,
1973.
39. Of course, it has been virtually impossible for even the ardent believers in product
safety among the standards-writers to enforce industry-adopted voluntary standards-even absent antitrust considerations. See Radiant Burners Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226
U.S. 20 (1912).
39.1. NCPS FINAL REPORT at 48.

40. Id. at 62.
41. The Effect Upon Small Business of Voluntary IndustrialStandards, Report of
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634

code bodies not following their own procedures and trade associations hiring officials of the code-writing bodies to, in effect,
lobby their former colleagues. It would not appear that tactics
of this sort are calculated to serve the public interest.
It was against this background that Congress wrote the
Consumer ProductSafety Act. 2 In so doing, the recommendation
of the National Commission on Product Safety that a third party
was necessary to assure the protection of consumers from unreasonable hazards, and that, indeed, the third party could only be
constituted from the public sector, was accepted.
D.

Consumer Product Safety Standards

The Consumer Product Safety Commission is that third
party. Now at full strength, it began operations with four of its
five Commissioners on May 14, 1973. The Commission, created
by the Consumer Product Safety Act,42.' has wide-ranging powers
and responsibilities over consumer products,43 designed44
(1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products;
(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of
consumer products;
(3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products
and to minimize conflicting State and local regulations; and
(4) to promote research and investigation into the causes and
prevention of product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.
Subcommittee No. 5 to the Select Committee on Small Business, House of
Representatives, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 75 (1968). See PreliminaryStaff Study, supra
note 15, at 19-21.
42. Public Law 92-573 (October 27, 1972), 86 Stat. 1207, 15 U.S.C. §§2501 et seq.
(hereinafter the Act).
42.1. Id.
43. The Act defines the term "consumer product" as including "any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for use in or around
a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise,
or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a
permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise," but
then goes on to list nine product areas where the Commission's jurisdiction is limited. Act,
Section 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1). The Commission apparently plans to read this
grant of statutory authority broadly. In response to a petition from Consumers Union, for
example, seeking the ban of the live pet turtle as a "hazardous product" since it causes
many thousands of cases of Salmonella-poisoning each year (which cannot be eliminated
by commercial breeding techniques), the Commission's General Counsel ruled that notwithstanding the general emphasis in the Act upon the inanimate, such live animals are
within the Commission's grant of statutory authority. See Current Report, BNA PROD.
SAFEry & LIAB. RPm., at 123 (Feb. 15, 1974).
44. Act, Section 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b).
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Our focus is only on the standards-making powers of the
Commission.4 5 The central features of the Commission's
standards-writing scheme are as follows. 6 When the Commission
determines that the adoption of a safety standard for a given
product is necessary to protect consumers from an unreasonable
risk of injury, it commences a proceeding by inviting interested
parties to submit within thirty days either an existing voluntary
standard or an offer to develop a product safety standard. Unless
the Commission accepts an existing voluntary standard as adequate to the task, it must accept one or more offers by qualified
offerors responding to its invitation to develop an appropriate
standard within a narrowly prescribed period of time. The standards development process, under the direction of the offeror,
must be open for public participation.
If the Commission has not received an offer within thirty
days after publication of its notice, or if none of the selected
offerors is making suitable progress in its developmental work,
the Commission may develop its own proposed safety standard.
When the sole offeror is the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer
of the consumer product proposed to be regulated, the Commission may proceed independently to develop its own proposals for
a safety rule." Once the work of the offeror is completed, the
Commission may publish in the FederalRegister a proposed consumer product safety rule for formal hearing or, absent a proposed ban of the product, discontinue the proceeding altogether.
Within a limited period of time after proposing a product
safety rule, the Commission must reach a final decision as to its
45. Generalized discussions about the Commission and its probable course of action
are available in the legal literature. See, Patton and Butler, The Consumer ProductSafety
Act-Its Impact on Manufacturersand on the Relationship between Seller and Consumer,
28 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 725 (1973); Note, The Consumer ProductSafety Act-Front-End
Protection for the Consumer Creates an Increased Burden of Care for the Consumer
ProductIndustry, 3 MEMPHIS STATE UNIv. L. REv. 344 (1973); Note, The Consumer Product Safety Act-Placebo or Panacea?, 10 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 814 (1973); Firedman,
Consumer Product Safety Act-In Products: New Freedoms, New Protections, 9 TRIAL
No. 4 at 42 (1973); Scalia and Goodman, ProceduralAspects of the Consumer Product
Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 899 (1973); Givens, Product Safety Standard-Making
Powers under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 243 (1973); Elkind,
Product Safety-"The Violent Sanctuary," 42 PENN. B.A.Q. 50 (1970).
These articles, and other works such as THE CONSUMER PRODUCr SAFETY AcT written
by the Editorial Staff of the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., provide ample background
material on the non-standards aspects of the Act and the Commission.
46. See Act, § § 7, 8 and 9, 15 U.S.C. § § 2056-58. An excellent critique of this scheme
is found in Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 906-08.
47. This provision in the Act reflects the concern of the Congress for the severe
deficiencies in the voluntary standards-writing process. During its consideration of the
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contents. Before the final decision, all interested parties must
again be given an opportunity to present their views. The end
result is a "consumer product safety standard".
This procedure for the promulgation of consumer product
safety standards is unique. Ordinary informal "notice and comment" rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act"'
requires, as a first step, the publication in the Federal Register
of the agency's proposal for comment by interested persons. Not
so, however, under the Consumer Product Safety Act. Here, the
first required step is not publication of a proposed rule, but rather
of the agency's determination that a rule is necessary, and an
invitation to all interested parties to help write it. The invitation
comes, therefore, at a time when the agency itself is still in the
process of developing its own initial proposals, and not after those
proposals have been formalized for comment. It is only after this
initial invitational phase is completed that the informal rulemaking under the Administrative ProcedureAct proceeds.
As Scalia and Goodman have pointed out:4"
Depending on how they are interpreted and applied, the
"pre-rulemaking procedures" of Section 7 may constitute anything from the very core of the rulemaking process to a set of
troublesome but inconsequential preliminaries. In and of themselves, these procedures have little operative effect. They do not
produce a rule, or even a proposed rule, but rather a proposal
for a proposed rule-which, if accepted by the Commission,
then becomes nothing more than the basis for debate in the
Act, the Senate had adopted amendments offered on the floor by Senator Nelson which

excluded from the class of prospective standards-writers any person who is a "manufacturer, distributor or retailer .. of a consumer product proposed to be included in the
consumer product safety standard to which the offer applies." In explaining the purpose
of his amendment, Senator Nelson commented: "The most serious condemnation of the
voluntary standards system which emerged from the studies of the Product Safety Commission and others-upon whose recommendations this entire bill is based-was the
chronic tendency of the standards committees to be dominated by companies with an
economic stake in the product. . . . Because consumers have had little or no voice in the
voluntary standards-making procedures, the standards have been industry dominated."
118 CONG. REc. S99256 (daily ed., June 21, 1972). The House, however, did not prohibit
the acceptance of offers from offerors who were manufacturers, distributors, or retailers.
In Conference, the final provisions of the Act were worked out as a legislative compromise,
with the caution, however, that these "provisions should not be interpreted . . . as preventing the Commission or its staff-while awaiting the submission of recommended
standards-from developing or acquiring the technical capability necessary to properly
evaluate the standards recommended to it." H. Rep. No. 92-1593, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
14 (1972).
47.1. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
48. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45 at 908.
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rulemaking proceeding under Section 9.
One of the major issues of procedural policy the Commission will face is the importance it wishes to assign the Section 7
stage of the rulemaking process. . . It may rely heavily upon
its selection of an appropriate developer and upon its specification of development procedures (pursuant to Section 7(d)(3)) to
assure a proposal which can ordinarily be adopted without substantial independent work. Or it may instead plan to devote a
large portion of its own resources to standards development, and
treat Section 7 as essentially a means of plackag useful private
suggestions before its staff.
On May 7, 1974, the Commission published final rules to
govern this "offeror" process 8 -1 These rules clearly indicate the
importance which the Commission attaches to the development
of standards by offerors. Among the "general policy considerations" underlying their formulation, the proposed rules establish
that "[t]he general policy under which [these] procedures . . .
are issued is that the interest and participation of the public is
vital for carrying out the functions of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission." They go on to state that "since safety
standards are intended to eliminate or reduce unreasonable risks
of injury associated with the use of consumer products, the Commission, in issuing these rules, seeks the involvement of all interested persons, the general public and especially, ultimate consumers." Moreover, they stipulate that "[p]ersons who are not
members of an established organization may form a group for the
express purpose of submitting offers and developing standards";
that "[p]ublic involvement will be encouraged through the use
of extensive public notice"; and that the provisions of the Act
permitting the Commission to contribute to the offeror's costs in
developing as standard should provide the means by which "a
cross section of interested persons, including consumers, can participate in the development of standards. 4 8 2
Obviously, then, the Commission intends to make its offeror
program the heart of its standards-writing effort. Moreover, the
rule jettisons the "consensus" approach to standards writing.49 It
explicitly provides that "unanimity among all participants [in
the offeror process] shall not be a prerequisite to the submission
by the offeror to the Commission of a standard which, in the
48.1. 39 Fed. Reg. 16206; 16 C.F.R. §1105.
48.2. Id.
49. See notes 35-37, supra, and accompanying text.
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offeror's judgment, optimally meets the terms of the offer accepted by the Commission."".'
Commissioner Lawrence Kushner, when asked if he thought
the Commission would adopt many of the existing voluntary
standards, stated:"0
In my view, it's very, very unlikely that an existing voluntary
standard would be appropriately made mandatory.
• . .First of all, if the standard was developed by a consensus method, its principal feature was that it was acceptable to
everybody, not that it reflected the best that was available, even
within the existing state of the art. And for us to make such a
standard a matter of law seems to me not to be a good practice
In fact, although petitions have been submitted to the Commission urging the adoption of voluntary standards, it has uniformly declined such invitations. Instead, it has thus far directed
that all such standards-writing efforts be channelled through the
offeror process. 5'
On paper then, the Commission's offeror program-the
prime process chosen by the Commission to generate consumer
product safety standards-would appear to be in fine shape. In
fact, though the first anniversary of the Commission's activation
has already passed, it is hardly off the ground, and is still under
a cloud of unresolved policy questions which could hobble the
49.1. 39 Fed. Reg. 16206, 16215.
50. Interview with Consumer Product Safety Commissioner Lawrence Kushner,
Current Report, BNA PROD. SAFETY AND LIAB. Rpr., at 7 (Jan. 4, 1974).
What Section 7 [of the Act, dealing with the offeror process] envisages is
that this group [of non-professionals] would be the ones which would offer the
invitation to the experts in the field to sit down around the table, and on a
schedule that they determine, to try to write the standard. Regardless of who
the successful offeror is, I would imagine that essentially the same people, the
same group of experts, would be involved in developing the standard. It still will
be principally industry-type people who will be sitting down at the table. But,
as I said, the table will be somebody else's table. This is not a trivial distinction
because the schedule will be different depending who the offeror may be. The
group that is administering the development of the standards will have a lot to
do with the rate at which the standard is developed .... [If consumer groups]
don't come forward and really take advantage of the opportunity which we will
be presenting under Section 7 rulemaking regulations, then I can only conclude
that it's a lack of interest, and to may way of thinking, that would be a lack of
responsibility on their part. Id.
51. See, e.g., Current Reports, BNA PROD. SAFETY AND LIAB. RPr. at 792 (October
19, 1973).
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program even
before the first offer to develop a safety standard
52
is extended.
If the Commission's offeror program is to live up to its promise of generating effective consumer product safety standards
through widespread participation, it must resolve two areas of
criticism. First, it must find a way to encourage the ongoing activities of the voluntary standards-writing groups while maintaining
objectivity in reviewing their work product. 3 Second, the Commission must overcome its current difficulties in effectively com52. The Commission has already committed itself to commencing proceedings on the
following product groups: matches, swimming pools, lawnmowers, architectural glass, and
electric extension cords. The next targets for regulations are likely to include space heaters, water heaters, furnaces, ovens and ranges, irons, ladders and liquid fuels. See PRODUCT
SAFETY LErrER, at 1 (Jan. 28, 1974).
53. The Act permits the Commission to publish an existing voluntary standard as its
own if it determines that such a standard "would eliminate or reduce the unreasonable
risk of injury associated with the product. . ." Act § 7(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2056(c)(2).
This requires the Commission to examine voluntary standards it might adopt with some
care. See H. Rep. No. 92-1152, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 14-15 (1972). The Commission is
also authorized to "assist public and private organizations, administratively and technically, in the development of safety standards and test methods." Act, § 5(b)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 2054(b)(3). This would seem to permit Commission participation in the internal
workings of the voluntary standards groups.
The Commission has established an Office of Standards Coordination and Appraisal
for handling these two tasks. It is "responsible for the development of standards and rules
for all standards developed by the Commission or by an offeror. It considers the legal,
technological, economic, and social impact of proposed standards. . . . It establishes the
governing policies for and encourages the development of standards by other agencies,
organizations and offerors. . . . It coordinates or calls industry-CPSC meetings during
standards development or potential standards development phases and establishes criteria for and determines the adequacy of standards development offerors." Organization
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Order No. 130.1, at 3-4 (May 14, 1973).
Unfortunately, because this one office of the Commission is given these simultaneous
responsibilities under the Act (i.e. to evaluate existing voluntary standards for possible
Commission use and to encourage the development of voluntary standards by private
groups), it and the Commission are locked into a disturbing potential conflict-of-interest
pattern. If the Commission, its Commissioners, or its employees are members or active
supporters of a private standards organization, and a standard proposed by such an
organization is subsequently adopted by the Commission, charges that the Commission's
action was taken or influenced as a result of the employee's membership in the private
organization can surely be anticipated. Further, it is quite possible that an employee's
membership in a particular standards organization may lead him to favor that group with
which he is familiar, over another equally qualified group. And needless to say, any
"suggestions" from a Commission employee to a private standards organization in which
he plays an active role as to the direction the organization might follow in formulating a
safety standard-even if labeled as the individual opinion of the suggestor and not that
of the Commission itself-would carry extraordinary weight. In short, membership or
active non-membership participation in the affairs of private standards-writing groups
creates the appearance of giving preferential treatment, and is probably prohibited by
existing statute and regulation. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 4410, 5946; 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.201 a(b),
a(d), a(f); 38 Comp. Gen. 800 (1959). Each of these issues has been thoroughly discussed
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municating with, and responding to, requests for action from individual consumers and their relatively underorganized representatives."
The potential of the Commission's offeror program is as yet
unfulfilled. If that potential is realized, the primacy of consumer
protection as the goal of product safety standardization will at
last be assured.
II.

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARDS IN THE COURTS

A.

Overview

Mandatory government safety standards for consumer products, such as those which will be formulated under the Consumer
in a publicly available memorandum by the Commission's Office of General Counsel on
"Membership of the CPSC in Private Standards Setting Organizations," dated January
3, 1974. The memorandum also discusses potential antitrust enforcement problems associated with governmental participation in these groups.
This institutional problem, created by the Act itself, has been examined at the Commissioner level. It is a significant policy question which, unless promptly and fairly resolved, could seriously impair the integrity of the nascent offeror program.
54. Ralph Nader's Health Research Group, for example, focusing on long-pending
petitions on toys and children's sleepwear, has severely criticized the Commission for its
inability to respond rapidly to important problems, and for its failure to issue standards
already proposed by its predecessor agencies. It complained about "the failure to promulgate regulations months and even years after they have been proposed and the period for
comment has run"; "the inability to answer petitions, letters or requests within a reasonable time"; "the failure to communicate, with any dispatch, Commission decisions to those
most immediately affected by them"; "an inability to inform parties, interested persons
and, perhaps, other sections of the Agency itself on the current status of matters under
investigation or the subject of formal deliberations"; "a weak and uncoordinated enforcement effort"; and "a failure to develop housekeeping regulations that would clarify responsibility and procedure for various duties." It concluded by noting that it did "not
mean to suggest that the Commission [was] in a state of chaos. What concerns us are
our fears that a continuance of the present pattern of inaction or non-response, particularly as the Commission embarks on standard setting, may seriously undermine [its]
ability to maintain the level of performance which consumers have a right to expect."

Current Report, BNA PROD.

SAFETY AND DhAB. Rpr.,

at 85 (February 1, 1974).

The Commission is slowly moving to remedy these administrative problems, and
much to its credit. It has established a meetings policy requiring advance public notice
of outside contacts at the Commissioner and staff level and an "openness" about the way
it conducts its business which is unprecedented in the federal bueaucracy. See 16
C.F.R. § 1001.60; Current Report, BNA PROD. SAFETY AND LTAB. Rrm., at 758 (Oct. 5,
1973). It has also published a "consumer product hazard index based on the frequency
and severity of injuries reported to hospital emergency rooms" to serve as a general guide
to its priorities in establishing safety regulations. See id. at 707 (Sept. 28, 1973).
It has not done well, however, in setting meaningful priorities among the consumerinitiated petitions it has received. For example, despite an alarming injury pattern involving thousands of children each month in potentially serious illness, in the admittedly
biased view of the authors the Commission has yet to take significant action on the
petition of Consumers Union to ban the sale of pet turtles as an irremedial source of
salmonellosis. See id. at 943 (Dec. 14, 1973); at 123 (Feb. 15, 1974). In contrast, when
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Product Safety Act, 55 will profoundly affect the relationship between the manufacturer and the marketplace. But the effects of
product safety standards may extend far beyond penalties for
non-compliance" and into the courts through the medium of civil
tort litigation. Even with a greatly increased number of mandatory safety standards, injured consumers will continue to initiate
lawsuits to seek recovery for product-related injuries. As the Consumer Product Safety Commission gears up its operation, and
sets standards for various products, 57 the courts will ever more
frequently be faced with the question of determining the
relevance of those standards in private tort litigation.
Although mandatory government safety standards are a relatively recent phenomenon, and although the first consumer product safety standard has yet to be issued under the Consumer
ProductSafety Act, the courts are nevertheless thoroughly familiar with the general concept of a "standard". Standards are inConsumers Union recently asked the Commission to ban a two-dollar gadget which had
the possiblity of delivering a lethal electrical shock, but about which the Commission
apparently had not even a single confirmed report of injury, the Commission completed
its testing and evaluation of the product, and stopped its distribution within days rather
than months. See PROD. SAFETY LETTER, at 1 (Feb. 11, 1974).
To aid the Commission in setting priorities among the consumer-initiated petitions
it receives, and to serve as an institutional focus within the Commission for consumer
input, Consumers Union has urged the Commission to create the staff position of "Consumer Counsel", patterned after the "Consumer Safety Advocate" post recommended by
the National Commission on Product Safety, but not made part of the final Act. See
NCPS FINAL REPORT, Proposed Consumer ProductSafety Act, at 5-6. As the Chairman
of the National Commission on Product Safety had made clear, the purpose of this independent safety advocate was to have been to help "safeguard against the weaknesses ...
observed in existing agencies. . . and to build a kind of tension into the agency." Elkind,
supra note 45 at 54.
The responsibilities of a "Consumer Counsel", as outlined by the Consumers Union
proposal, would include:
(a) reorganizing the consumer complaint handling operation of CPSC, (b) advising CPSC as to the impact on consumers of potential CPSC decisions, (c)
representing and articulating consumer viewpoints, especially at the CPSC staff
level at the formative stages of policymaking, and (d) establishing liaison with
consumer organizations and representatives, alerting them to ongoing activities
of CPSC and aiding them in formulating sound and supportable policy positions
for CPSC consideration.
Unless the Commission, either through the appointment of a Consumer Counsel, or
by some other technique, makes changes in the manner in which it responds to individual
and consumer group requests for action, it may be unable to generate widespread interest
and participation among these groups and individuals in the arduous task of standardswriting under the Commission's offeror program.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. See notes 42.1-54 supra, and accompanying text.
56. See §§ 20 and 21 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2069-2070.
57. See notes 46-51, supra, and accompanying text.
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volved in both negligence and strict products liability tort actions.
Recovery in tort under a negligence theory, for example, is
premised upon the concept of a legally recognized duty to conform to a standard of conduct or a standard of due care." To the
injured plaintiff falls the initial task of defining the duty and
delineating a standard of conduct which the defendant failed to
meet.
Dissatisfaction with negligence and warranty theories as the
bases for recovery by injured consumers, however, led to the development of strict products liability as an alternative cause of
action. 9 This development aroused great hope that the injured
would be freed of the considerable burden imposed by the law of
negligence. Unfortunately, as is well documented in the literature, this hope has largely been dashed.6" The plaintiff in a strict
liability case no longer must set forth a standard of due care
which the defendant has failed to meet, but still need prove that
the product which caused the injury contained a "defect.""1 Although the concept of defectiveness has eluded precise definition,6 2 proof of "defect" invariably requires a showing of deviation
from a norm.13 Therefore, under any of the prevailing tort theories, the court, of necessity, must be concerned with a standard
of conduct which the defendant failed to meet. 4 An examination
of the treatment by the courts of such standards in tort litigation
THE LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th Ed. 1971).
59. Id. at 641-56. For the outlines of the development of the cause of action in one
state, see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972).
60. Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. RMv. 325, 326
n.5 (1971); Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 562 (1969); Keeton, Products
Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1335-36
(1966); Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 50
(1966); Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO.
L.J. 286, 323 (1966). But see Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 901 (1967).
61. The most widely accepted formulation of this relatively new tort is that of

58. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
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should shed some light on the future role of consumer product
safety standards in the courts. It is to this examination that we
turn.
B.

Industry Custom and Voluntary Standards in the Courts

Industry custom has played a pervasive role in tort litigation.
The generally accepted safety practices within an industry-its
customs-are essentially precursors to its formalized safety standards.
Failure to follow industry custom has long been recognized
as evidence of negligence. 5 On rare occasion, such failure has
even been deemed the equivalent of negligence per se.66 Compliance with custom, however, though routinely admitted as evidence of proper conduct, is, almost without exception, never
taken as the conclusive measure of duty or due care.17 As Justice
Holmes succinctly stated, "What usually is done may be evidence
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The RESTATEMENT formulation has recently been criticized as "burdenfing] the injured
plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of negligence," Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). The alternate
formulation of the tort is that of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963): "A manufacturer is strictly liable
in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."
62. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Productsand Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1965); Note, The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972, 61
CALIF. L. REv. 289, 661 (1973).
63. "Deviation from a norm" encompasses defects both of design and of manufacture.
"A defect may emerge from the mind of the designer as well as from the hand of the
workman. . . .Although it is easier to see the 'defect' in a single imperfectly fashioned
product than in an entire line badly conceived, a distinction between manufacture and
design defects is not tenable." Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134, 501 P.2d
1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972), citing Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d
465, 467 P.2d 299, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970). See Kessler, supra note 60 at 900, n. 71.
64. Because the standard of conduct is a judicial concern in both negligence and strict
products liability cases, references in the remainder of this article to negligence concepts
are also intended to include strict liability causes of action.
65. See, e.g., Gyerman v. United States Lines Co., 7 Cal. 3d 488, 501-502, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 795, 498 P.2d 1043 (1972) and cases cited therein (custom as admissible evidence
for its bearing upon contributory negligence).
66. See Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner &
Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 852 (4th Cir. 1972).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, Section 295A: "In determining whether
conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others under like circumstances,
are factors to be taken into account, but are not controlling where a reasonable man would
not follow them"; HARPER AND JAMES, 2 LAw OF ToRTs §17.3 (1956). See also, Princemont
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of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by
a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied
with or not." 8
Voluntary standards69 have similarly received this two-level
treatment from the courts. They are generally admitted as evidence on the negligence issue;"0 they are virtually
never taken as
7
a conclusive measure of duty or due care.

1

Industry custom and the tort standard of due care are, therefore, interrelated but not identical concepts. And, as with its
logical successor-the formalized voluntary standard-industry
Construction Corp. v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1217, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Baker v. Pidgeon
Thomas Co., 422 F.2d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 1970); June T., Inc. v. King, 290 F.2d 404, 406
(5th Cir. 1961); Troupe v. Chicago, D. & G. Bay Transit Co., 234 F.2d 253, 260 (2d Cir.
1956); Low v. Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291, 297 (1972); Prine v. Thelen, Wyo.,
496 P.2d 905, 907 (1972); Schmidt v. Beninga, 285 Minn. 477, 173 N.W.2d 401, 408 (1970);
Wellenheider v. Rader, 49 N.J. 1, 227 A.2d 329, 332 (1967); Thomas v. Arvon Products
Co., 424 Pa. 365, 227 A.2d 897, 899 (1967). See generally Morris, Custom and Negligence,
42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1942).
68. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
69. For a definition and discussion of voluntary standards, see notes 15-30, supra, and
accompanying text.
70. See L. FRUMER and M. FRIEDMAN, 1 PRODucTs LIABILITY §5.04. Compare Post v.
Manitowoc Engineering Corp., 88 N.J. Super. 199, 211 A.2d 386, 391 (1965) and McComish v. DeSoi, 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116, 120-23 (1964) with Vroman v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 387 F.2d 732, 737-38 (6th Cir. 1967) and Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d
637, 640-41 (10th Cir. 1967). In McComish, supra, a leading case, expert witnesses had
testified that the cables and clamps used in the construction of an "A" sling were not in
accord with various safety codes and manuals, and that these manuals set up standards
of safe practice in the field. In holding that the safety codes or manuals were admissible
in evidence on the issue of negligence, the McComish court stated:
The basic test as to the responsibility of [the manufacturer] here is whether
reasonable care was exercised in the construction and assembly of the A sling.
That is the standard to be used and departure or deviation therefrom is negligence. In applying the standard reasonable men recognize that what is usually
done may be evidence of what ought to be done. And so the law permits the
methods, practices or rules experienced men generally accept and follow to be
shown as an aid to the jury in comparing the conduct of the alleged tortfeasor
with the required norm of reasonable prudence. It is not suggested that the
safety practices are of themselves the absolute measure of due care. They are
simply evidence of 'how to' assemble the sling as commonly practiced by those
who have experience in doing it. It is important that their limited function and
probative force as evidence be appreciated. What ought to be done is fixed by
the standard of reasonable prudence, and in law that requirement remains the
same whether it is usually complied with or not. Thus, what is usually done in
a particular industry cannot be regarded as what ought to be done unless the
conduct and the test are in harmony.
200 A.2d at 121 (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240
N.W. 392, 396 (1932) ("Obviously, manufacturers cannot, by concurring in a careless or
dangerous method of manufacture [as prescribed by the American Society of Mechanical
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custom in safety-related areas has set something less than a blistering pace in reducing human injury. 72
C. Statutes and Regulation in the Courts
Unlike industry custom and voluntary standards, statutes,
the formal public reflection of the total community's judgment
about requirements for its own safety and health, are treated by
the courts in tort litigation with considerable respect. 73 Where
relevant, courts always admit statutes as evidence on the issue of
negligence at the instance of either the plaintiff or the
defendant. 74 And most jurisdictions treat the violation of a statute
which was meant to protect the plaintiff from the type of harm
complained of, and which was the proximate cause of the harm,
as negligence per se.75 Defendants, however, are still precluded
Engineers and the Wisconsin Boiler Code], establish their own standard of care.") See
also McComish v. DeSoi, 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964); Philo, Use of Safety Standards,
Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1 (1965); Note,
Admissibility of Safety Codes, Rules and Standardsin Negligence Cases, 37 TENN. L. REV.
581 (1970).
72. See notes 37-41, supra and accompanying text; The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740
(2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern Transportation Co. v. Northern Barge Co., 287
U.S. 662 (1932). In The T.J. Hooper,barges towed by tugboats were lost off the New Jersey
coast in an easterly gale. The tugs carried no radio receivers with which to obtain warnings
of the changing weather conditions. Even though only one tugboat line customarily
equipped its tugs with receiving sets, the trial court ruled that the tugs, which were not
so outfitted, were unseaworthy. Judge Learned Hand, affirming that judgment for the
Court of Appeals, stated:
II]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly
it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption
of new and available devices. It never may set its own test, however persuasive
be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions
so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
60 F.2d at 740.
73. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
§ 288B. Effect of Violation
(1) The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the
standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.
(2) The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is
not so adopted may be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.
§ 288 C. Compliance With Legislation or Regulation
Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man
would take additional precautions.
74. See, e.g., Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d
707, 710 (1971), allocaturrefused; Piper v. Hill, 185 Neb. 568, 177 N.W.2d 509, 512 (1970).
Of course, statutes, custom, and formal standards may be introduced as evidence of
contributory negligence as well as negligence.
75. See, e.g., Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328, 508 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1973); Hall v.
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from asserting that compliance with a statute is conclusive on the
question of due care, since reasonable men may have done more.7"
Municipal ordinances, administrative regulations, and other
pronouncements of lesser consequence than state or federal
statutes do not fare quite as well at the hands of judges. Although
they are routinely admitted into evidence, it is less common that
proof of their violation is treated as negligence per se.77
The courts, in sum, are not strangers to specific and detailed
standards in civil litigation. Such standards have regularly been
admitted into evidence on the issue of due care, and, where the
standards have been formulated through governmental procedures, they have been elevated to a most important role in the
plaintiff's, though not the defendant's, case.
D. Product Safety Standards in the Courts
The primary technique that will be utilized by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission to reduce unreasonable risks of injury from consumer products is the issuance of consumer product
safety standards. Although products likely to be the subject of
regulation have been targeted by the Commission, the first such
Mertz, 14 Ariz. App. 24, 480 P.2d 361, 363 (1971); Sheppard v. Judkins, 476 S.W.2d 102,
107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (application for writ of error refused, no reversible error); Brand
v. J.H. Rose Trucking Co., 102 Ariz. 201, 427 P.2d 519, 523 (1967); Sanchez v. J. Barron
Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 427 P.2d 240, 244 (1967); Douglas v. Edgewater Park Co., 369
Mich. 320, 119 N.W.2d 567, 571 (1963); Smith v. Blow and Cote, Inc., 124 Vt. 64, 196 A.2d
489, 492 (1963). In Florida, violation of some statutes is negligence per se, but violation of
others is only evidence of negligence. deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., Fla., 281
So.2d 198, 200-201 (1973). Violations may be excused under some circumstances and some
observers believe that where legislation is "trivial, obsolete, or entirely unreasonable" the
courts should not ignore the fact that the community standard permits a reasonable man
to disobey it. Prosser, supra note 58 at 200, see Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250, 257-66
(Alaska 1971).
76. "Compliance with a law or administrative regulation relieves the actor of negligence per se, but it does not establish as a matter of law that due care was exercised."
Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971); Grand
Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (1892).
77. For violations of ordinances and regulations admitted as evidence of negligence,
see, e.g., McCoy v. Coral Hills Associates, Inc., D.C., 264 A.2d 896, 899 (1970); Mills v.
A.B. Dick Company, 26 Mich. App. 164, 182 N.W.2d 79,81 (1970); Price v. Sinnott, Nev.,
460 P.2d 837, 839-40 (1969); Douglas v. Edgewater Park Company, 369 Mich. 320, 119
N.W.2d 567, 571 (1963); Major v. Waverly and Ogden, Inc., 7 N.Y.2d 332, 165 N.E.2d 181,
184, 197 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1960). For violations of ordinances and regulations treated as
negligence per se, see, e.g., H.R.H. Construction Corp. v. Conroy, 411 F.2d 722, 724 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Miles v. Ryan, 338 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Ferrell v. Baxter, 484
P.2d 250, 263-64 (Alaska 1971); Citerella v. United Illuminating Company, 158 Conn. 600,
266 A.2d 382, 386 (1969); Raymond v. Baehr, 282 Minn. 109, 163 N.W.2d 51, 54 (1968);
Anderson v. Blackfoot Livestock Commission Co., 85 Idaho 64, 375 P.2d 704, 709 (1962),
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safety standard has yet to be promulgated.7 8 Therefore, no judge
has yet been confronted with the problem of determining the
status of mandatory consumer product safety standards in private tort litigation. However, judicial attitudes toward industry
customs, voluntary standards, and statutes and ordinances, as
well as the Consumer Product Safety Act itself, provide reliable
guideposts for predicting the manner in which consumer product
safety standards will be received by the courts.
Consumer product safety standards, like statutes, bear the
imprimatur of public approval, and their violation is punishable
by criminal and/or civil penalties.7 9 Like statutes, 0 consumer
product safety standards should, where relevant, always be
admitted into evidence on negligence issues at the instance of
either the plaintiff or the defendant. Industry custom and
voluntary standards are routinely accepted as probative of due
care or its absence.8 ' Yet, custom and voluntary standards, unlike
statutes and consumer product safety standards, largely reflect
only the affected industry's collective perception of requisite minimum safety precautions .12 Consumer product safety standards,
however, involve far more comprehensive determinations. These
83
standards may not issue without findings with respect to:
(A) the degree and nature of the risk of injury the rule is designed to eliminate or reduce;
(B) the approximate number of consumer products, or types or
classes thereof, subject to such rule;
(C) the need of the public for the consumer products subject to
such rule, and the probable effect of such rule upon the utility,
cost, or availability of such products to meet such need; and
(D) any means of achieving the objective of the order while
minimizing adverse effects on competition or disruption or dislocation of manufacturing and other commercial practices consistent with the public health and safety.
and the additional conclusions that:8
(A) . . . the rule (including its effective date) is reasonable necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury
associated with such product;
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See note 52 supra, and accompanying text.
See §§ 20 and 21 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2069-70.
See notes 73-77 supra, and accompanying text.
See notes 65-72 supra, and accompanying text.
See notes 35-41 supra, and accompanying text.
See Act, section 9(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (c)(1).
Act, section 9(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(2).
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(B) . . . the promulgation of the rule is in the public interest;
and

(C) in the case of a rule declaring the product a banned hazardous product, that no feasible consumer product safety standard
under this chapter would adequately protect the public from
unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product.
It follows, then, that consumer product safety standards, like
safety statutes and their less illustrious brethren, industry custom and voluntary standards, should be admitted into evidence
5
in private tort litigation on the issue of due care.
Whether failure to comply with consumer product safety
standards should be considered, as are statutes, negligence per
se, is a slightly more difficult question. General safety statutes,
such as traffic laws, are directed to the public at large whose
members may or may not be aware of their content. By contrast,
consumer product safety standards are aimed at, and regulate the
conduct of, well-defined groups: manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and importers. These groups, which profit from the sale
of the regulated products, not only have the opportunity to participate directly in the formulation of the standards by which
their products are regulated, but also are ignorant of their provisions at pain of substantial penalties." Thus, while a sense of
injustice might be aroused when the violation of a general safety
statute results in a finding of negligence per se against a member
of the general public, 88 the same sense of injustice would not be
engendered by a rule which imposes upon a special highly knowledgeable class a similar level of responsibility for complying with
consumer product safety standards. Indeed, judicial treatment of
the violation of such standards as negligence per se will further
the general purposes of the Consumer Product Safety Act."8
There is no doubt, however, that compliance with consumer
product safety standards should never be considered conclusive
on the question of due care. No extra-judicial standard-be it
industry custom, voluntary standard, or even safety statute-is
ever accorded such conclusive effect.'" Consumer product safety
85. Cf. Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corporation, 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973).
86. See notes 73-77 supra, and accompanying text.
87. See note 79 supra, and accompanying text.
88. See note 75 supra, and accompanying text.
89. Section 23 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2072, for example, provides for private damage
suits by persons injured by knowing, including willful, violations of Commission standards
or rules.
90. See notes 67, 68, and 76 supra, and accompanying text.
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standards set a safety floor below which consumer products must
not fall. If persons are injured by products which meet these
mandatory standards, they nevertheless are entitled to their day
in court to demonstrate that additional precautions were necessary in the exercise of due care."
Insofar as the Consumer Product Safety Act addresses the
role of product safety standards in the courts, it supports these
92
projections about their likely treatment. Section 25(a) of the Act
provides:
Compliance with consumer product safety rules or other rules
or orders" under this Act shall not relieve any person from
liability at common law or under State statutory law to any
other person. 4
On its face, this provision prohibits in very clear terms the conclusive, defensive, use of such standards in tort litigation. But it
does not address the question of the admissibility of these standards, and it does not consider the offensive use of the standards
by a plaintiff who is the victim of a manufacturer's failure to
comply. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that section 25(a) of
the Act might prohibit the admission into evidence of such standards in the case for the defense.15 Previous judicial treatment of
91. This discussion does not address the complication of injuries caused by products
marketed before t1~e formulation or effective date of a consumer product safety standard.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a).
93. The Senate version of the Act, S. 3419, correctly spoke in terms of compliance
with any consumer product safety "standard" and not, as indicated in this Act, of such
"rules or orders." The legislative history offers no explanation of why the incorrect House
language prevailed.
94. The Senate Commerce Committee's report on the Senate bill, S. 3419 (Senate
Report No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.), explained: "This subsection [§319(c)] reaffirms
the fact that product safety standards promulgated in accordance with this bil are 'minimum' standards. Therefore, in product liability litigation compliance with applicable
Federal safety standards would not automatically create a defense for the manufacturer."
The House Commerce Committee's Report (No. 92-1153, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.) described the section without offering any explanation. No mention of the section was made
in the Conference Report (No. 92-1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.), or in the Senate or House
debates.
Sections 25(b) and 25(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2074(b) and (c), which forbid the
admissibility in civil litigation of Commission failure to take any action or commence a
proceeding with respect to the safety of a consumer product, and make Commission
accident and investigation reports available to the public, respectively, were, like section
25(a), originally found in section 29 of the legislation proposed by the National Commission on Product Safety. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, ProposedConsumerProductSafety Act,
at 9. All parts of the proposed section 29 were enacted into law except the subsection on
use of evidence of compliance in civil litigation. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
95. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 903 n.34 (1973). For analysis of a similar
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standards in the courts and the language of the Act and its legislative history, however, fail to support this suggestion.
As part of its Report to the President and the Congress, the
National Commission on Product Safety submitted proposed legislation." That proposal contained provisions virtually identical
to §25 of the Act, with one crucial difference. It included the
7
following subsection:
Evidence that an entire finished product complies with regulations or standards issued by the Commission shall be inadmissible in any private litigation except an action to recover treble
damages pursuant to Section 30.
This subsection would have rendered inadmissible in private tort
litigation evidence of compliance with consumer product safety
standards. The fact that this subsection had been proposed to the
Congress, but was never included in either the House or Senate
versions of the Act, suggests a legislative intent to permit the
introduction of such evidence in tort suits. Thus, by adopting
Section 25(a) of the Act, Congress enacted into law a guideline
for the judicial use of the new consumer product safety standards
that is in accord with the treatment given by the courts to custom, voluntary standards, statutes, and regulations-the precursors of consumer product safety standards.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Consumer Product Safety Act is the culmination of
many years of consumer frustration over unsafe consumer products posing unreasonable risks of injury. Marketplace forces
failed to solve the serious problems of hazardous consumer products, and governmental intervention in the form of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission became necessary. The consumer
product safety standards which will be issued under the Act, with
the active participation of consumers as well as producers, should
vastly improve the level of product safety in the United States.
Even with effective standards, however, some injuries associated
with consumer products are inevitable. If the courts permit consumer product safety standards to play an appropriate role in the
resolution of private tort claims, then the Consumer Product
Safety Act will well-serve the public both in the marketplace and
in the courts.
federal standards-setting statute, see Nader and Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 645, 675-77 (1967) (National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act).
96. See NCPS INAL REPORT, Proposed Consumer Product Safety Act.
97. Id. at 9.
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